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YUGOSLAVIA AT THE CROSSROADS 
A SOCIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE 
by Zdcnko Roter 
*Dr. Zdenko Roter is a professor and dean of the School of Sociology, Political 
Science, and Journalism of University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia. This is an expanded 
version of a lecture which he delivered at Rosemont College, PA on December 2, 1987. 
Outside observers, especially to interested Americans, may find it very hard to 
comprehend what is going on in contemporary Yugoslavia, a country in the southeast of Europe, 
where Western and Eastern culture intersect, as do the conflicting interests, both political and 
economic, of the U.S.A. and the European Common Market on one side and the U.S.S.R. and 
Eastern European countries on the other. 
Yugoslavia, comprised of six republics and two autonomous regions, seven nations 
(Serbians, Croatians, Slovenes, Maccdonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, and Albanians), is today, 
seven years after the death of President Tito, in a deep crisis. The to official 1986 statistics lists 
the population in Yugoslavia as follows: 
index of increase 
(in thousands) 1961 1971 1981 1984 1981-1961 
Yugoslavia 18549 20543 22425 23271 121 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3278 3746 4124 4356 126 
Montenegro 472 530 580 619 124 
Croatia 4160 4426 4601 4665 11 
Macedonia 1406 1647 1909 2041 136 
Slovenia 1592 1727 1892 1934 119 
Serbia (entire) 7642 8447 9314 9656 122 
Serbia proper 
(without provinces) 4823 5250 5694 5803 118 
Kosovo 964 1244 1584 1804 164 (!) 
Vojvodina 1855 1953 2035 2049 1 10 
(From the table one can note the great population explosion of Albanians in Kosovo and 
the population crisis in Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Croatia, and Slovenia). 
This cannot be considered a temporary or momentary, or crises merely the result of the 
departure of a charismatic leader, which Josip Broz-Tito undoubtedly was, from the historical 
stage. Rather, this is a "long wave" crisis, deep and structural. It encompasses all sectors of 
societal and individual existence, from the economy, culture, and education to politics, morality, 
and religion. Individual and social life as a whole is disturbed. Relationships, standards, and values, 
previously considered unquestionable and permanent, have been destroyed. That means, among 
other things, a new sense of deep disappointment and an uncertainty in regard to individuals' 
personal future and that of their children, and of the community as a whole. 
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This can be illustrated by the results of a public opinion research in the Republic of 
Slovenia.1 To the question how living conditions today compared to living conditions f ive years 
before the respondents replied: 
In% ·:i��r tQda:i i� bett�r th� �mm� is wQrse 
a) how people 
live 1978 85.2 12.1 2.2 
1980 73.3 18.0 7.2 
1984 17.7 16.6 69.1 
1987 22.3 15.5 59.9 
b )democratic 
decision-making 
1978 72.3 23.2 2.7 
1980 61.4 20.1 2.7 
1984 13.7 43.9 24.9 
1987 20.7 34.0 31.7 
c )respect for 
work and workers 
1978 58.6 31.8 8.1 
1980 50.9 27.8. 13.1 
1984 19.8 37.5 34.9 
1987 14.6 26.6 53.1 
e)opportunity for 
employment 1978 54.8 27.6 15.9 
1980 47.2 18.3 27.2 
1984 4.3 8.7 81.9 
1987 10.7 14.4 72.0 
f) legality 1978 58.5 33.1 5.5 
1980 55.3 23.6 6.5 
1984 9.8 47.5 22.7 
1987 9.9 38.2 33.7 
g)ability to 
have and raise 
children 1978 59.4 30.0 8.7 
1980 54.1 27.1 11.7 
1984 7.6 13.6 73.6 
1987 13.1 16.1 67.6 
Although it is impossible to generalize the above data for the entire country, they are, 
nevertheless, indicative of the mood of the entire population. The trend clearly points to a 
tremendous change after 1980. There is an exceptional increase in criticism about living 
conditions, not only in respect to such opportunities, as getting jobs or raising children, but also 
·about the possibility of realizing those political liberties which are dependent on the actual 
functioning of those principles of legality and democracy. Also evident is the erosion of the 
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concept of Yugoslavia as a workers' state. In 1984 half of the Slovenians believed that the 
situation in the previous five years had worsened than five years ago in regard to the respect for 
work and workers. 
The hypothesis or a deep, structural crisis of individual and social life and even in 
Yugoslavia as a community of republics, nationalities, and ethnic communities can be illustrated 
not only with other data from this Slovenian research but also from everyday life. Perhaps the 
most indicative such example is the case of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo; here, the 
national conflict between Serbs and Albanians has been acted out openly on the political scene 
since 1981. We shall not analyze this conflict, but a few remarks may be helpful. The Serbian 
press in Belgrade has been recently publishing articles about the "Kosovo night" of six-and-half 
years, to illustrate the alleged repression of the Serbs in Kosovo inflicted by the Albanian 
majority. In opposition to these articles some of the political leaders of Slovenia (whose views are 
supported by other Slovene intellectuals) asserted that the "Kosovo night" has lasted considerably 
longer; it encompasses centuries. Clearly the historical background is important for the analysis of 
the situation in Kosovo. Such analyses cannot be grounded merely on the slogan that Kosovo is 
the "barrel of gunpowder" of the Balkans or on the basis of data about the migration of Serbs and 
Montenegrins from Kosovo to Serbia proper and Montenegro respectively. 
One segment of the political elite in Yugoslavia holds the view that the crisis is first and 
foremost an economical crisis-a crisis of production, a collapse of the Yugoslav economy and the 
economic system. According to this diagnosis, restricting and perhaps even completely eliminating 
the crisis would be possible with certain economic measures, changes in the economic system, and 
the help of international financial foundations and corporations. Supporting such a view are, at 
least at first glance, many arguments. The percentage of economic growth in the past few years 
was minimal or stagnant; the inflation has increased annually, reaching about 130-150% in 1987. 
The number of firms suffering losses has steadily increased. The number of unemployed is 
growing. Also growing is the number of those employed whose incomes are below the acceptable 
minimum. The ability of companies to start new plants and accumulate capital has also reached 
critical levels because the funds remaining to them are dwindling; the share of their contributions 
to the government is enormous. This necessarily affects the ability of the entire country to meet 
its financial obligations: Yugoslavia has had to request the refinancing of its debt to foreign 
creditors.2 Such an economic situation lms had an impact in the dramatic decrease of living 
standard (social and individual) as well as in the increase of protests by workers, especially through 
of strikes.3 
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These are only some evidences of an economic crisis which has never before been so 
thoroughgoing and general in postwar Yugoslavia. The fairly strong group of political leaders cited 
earlier believes that this situation is primarily the result of certain defects in the economic system, 
the poor performance of economic leaders (of "management" in the true sense of the word one can 
hardly speak), the incorrect attitude of workers toward work, mistakes in investments (reference is 
made to so-called political factories) as well as the egoistic behavior of political elites in certain 
republics, who, by, allegedly building "national economies," make impossible the formation of a 
Yugoslav market which disregards borders between the republics. The last measures (a mini 
program of economic stabilization) of the Yugoslav federal government in 1987,4 are in my 
opinion based on these and similar suppositions. 
My own general hypothesis, however, is that the crisis of Yugoslav society is primarily 
political: on the level of the political order, the political system, and political ideology. The real 
roots, I believe, are roots, with various effects, including economic ones. Let us attempt to verify 
this hypothesis. 
A BOLSHEVIK BURDEN 
From a sociological perspective the politic-social ideology of the leading Yugoslav elite 
is still burdened with Bolshevik models, concepts, and stereotypes. Primarily this view focuses on 
the basic structure of society, seeing the economic basis as the most important component, which 
later exerts an influence upon the so-called superstructure (politico-,legal formation and all forms 
of social consciousness from religion and art to science). This superstructure, according to this 
conviction, cannot essentially or qualitatively affect social development. The claim of those who 
follow this model is that the only correct socialist, just society is that in which the role of the 
"elect people" (in the charismatic sense of that word) is played by the working class, understood as 
the class of so-called "direct producers," namely industrial laborers. Other social strata are, 
according to this model, in some sense marginal; they cannot function as independent carriers of 
social progress. They can only be welcome collaborators, suitable allies (but also enemies) of the 
working class. 
The just, socialist society can rely only upon the dominant role of social (state) 
ownership of the means of production, which alone is capable of eliminating the exploitation of 
some people by others.5 Such dogmatic views had, and continue to have very problematic effects 
upon social and economic development. Only thus can we explain that to this day the private 
ownership of land by peasants is limited to 10 hectares [about 20 acres] of arable land, although 
such a practice is in direct contradiction to both modem farming technology and the attitudes of the 
Yugoslav population. 
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Rcs!!arch into public opinion in Slovenia in 1987 showed that as many as 74.5% of the 
respondents believe that this agricultural maximum should be eliminated, and that the private 
farmers should be able to own as much land as they arc able to farm. As many as 62.5% of 
respondents believe that the government should permit stock holding in economic enterprises. And 
77.5% urged the elimination of firms with perennial economic losses, indicating that people want 
a real market economy, the creation of new, efficient companies and the elimination of old, 
inefficient economic firms. Such opinions assume that the economy must be emancipated from 
politics, that the producers must become independent, that the state must not directly intervene in 
the economic development, and, especially, that the state definitely must cease bailing out and 
thereby artificially keeping alive firms which have no economic reason to exist. 
Further social and economic development of Yugoslavia thus depends, in my opinion, on 
the readiness of the political elite to liberate itself decisively from Bolshevik stereotypes and of the 
heritage of the Stalinist definitions of "political economy." 
POLITICAL AUTHORITARIANISM 
Another reason for the crisis of Yugoslav society is the predominant model of political 
leadership which directs society from the top down. This model starts with basic presuppositions. 
The first is the conviction that politics is the decisive factor of social development. All decisions 
must be definitely considered and adopted in the political realm, whether they concern the 
economy, science, art, culture, religion, or some other area. Hence until now there has always been 
talk of economic, cultural, scientific, and even religious politics. This constitutes a domination by 
politics, or more accurately by the political elite, in all spheres of social life. 
The second presupposition is that good and efficient decisions are only possible if they are 
made at the political top. The implications that the initiatives of the broadest social strata, groups, 
and even individuals are at best tolerated, but without fail they must be either approved at the top 
or rejected if they are in opposition to the ideas of the political elite. Such a model of directing 
society may have made sense and worked efficiently in the years immediately after World War II, 
when the Yugoslav economy was completely destroyed. Present conditions in the country, 
however point to the complete exhaustion of this model. Not only is it inefficient, it actually 
slows down development. Under contemporary circumstances it means, that a political elite which 
wants to maintain itself must clearly manipulate the citizens and must make decisions itself 
instead of the citizenry, through in their name.6 Surely Yugoslavia should depart from the model 
of so-called, "people's democracy" or "socialist democracy," practiced in socialist states, and at 
least to some degree in Yugoslavia, which has always meant the neglect if not also the actual 
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negation of the political maturity, independence, and responsibility of social groups individual 
citizens. 
LACK OF POLITICAL PLURALISM 
Directly linked to the problem of political democracy is also the question of political 
pluralism, still not practiced effectively in Yugoslavia.? Until now political pluralism was more 
or less, directly or indirectly, rejected as a relic of so-called bourgeois society, which was believed, 
had contributed to human progress and so-called human liberties only in comparison to feudal 
societies; these civil political liberties are of no use in socialist society, which will develop a 
higher type of human rights and political liberties. Such arguments were also used to reject the 
multiparty political system as reactionary. Socialist democracy as a higher type of democracy was 
to transcend multiparty political pluralism and develop a non-party democracy which would 
simultaneously become a direct democracy. 
In Yugoslavia efforts have been evident for years, after the break with Stalin and the 
Stalinist model of democracy, to develop an economic democracy with the well known concept of 
workers' selfmanagement. Despite the current economic situation we must say that the concept of 
workers' selfmanagement continues to deserve great attention; it is an effort to give the work�rs in 
both industrial and non-industrial companies as much direct decision-making as possible in a 
program of action and its actualization. Workers' councils, assemblies of workers, and other forms 
of decision-making are real progress in the participation of workers in managing of firms. It 
must be said, however, that until now workers' selfmanagement did not in practice come to 
fruition primarily because of the interference of the state in the economy. With only minimal 
independence of companies of the Communist Party in immediate economic decision-making, 
the area of the actual decision-making by workers essentially shrank or even vanished. Yet, this 
feature of sclfmanagement was and remains the essential qualitative difference between Yugoslavia 
and the countries of Eastern Europe, where it is only recently Michael Gorbachev has been 
attempting to realize Lenin's idea "factories to the people." Additionally, Yugoslavia has attempted 
to implement the idea of direct political democracy through the so-called "delegational" political 
system, but, so far, the results arc minimal. 
Despite all these efforts the great question of free expression of political ideas and 
political interests remains completely open. Research of public opinion in Slovenia showed 8 that 
48.4% of the population still believes that "selfmanagement enables the actualization of human 
liberties and creativity." Yet that that same population is very critical visavis the 
institutionalization of this idea, the practice of selfmanagement. 52% of the respondents are neither 
part of selfmanaging or delegational structures nor are they ready to be involved in the future. At 
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the same time nearly 54.4% of respondent believe that labor strikes (which take place outside of 
the institutional system) may be able solve many issues. As many as 67.6% of the population 
believe in eliminating the category of so-called verbal crimes [public criticism] and in enabling an 
open critical political discourse; 57.8% of respondents believe that the independence of so-called 
alternative social movements (e.g. ecological, peace, feminist.) ought to be legalized. 46.4% of the 
respondents said that they participate in these movements or are ready to do so.9 
From these empirical data one may conclude with a fair degree of certainty that the idea of 
selfmanagement is still fairly alive in popular awareness. The dissatisfaction with the actual 
functioning of the political system has reached extreme dimensions. It is thus impossible to talk 
about political apathy. Rather, people themselves are trying to find ways out of the political crisis 
by sympathizing with and participating in alternative social movements ranging from strikes to 
ecological and peace activities. 
The central question relating to the possible achievement of political pluralism in 
Yugoslavia concerns the position and role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.1 0 The 
Party Congress in 1952 proclaimed the principle of separation of Party and government, so that 
direct decision-making by the Party in government matters would be replaced by the so-called 
"directing of societal development." The relative independence of government authorities and other 
institutions of the political system is implied here. In real life, however this never did take place. 
On the last instance, Communist Party organization always decides on the fate of the community, 
the state, the people, and the republics from the federal to the borough level, while accepting no 
responsibility for mistaken and sometimes even catastrophic decisions. 
So-called "responsibility for directing societal development" is understood by the party 
professionals as an exclusive right to make all decisions. There are no real institutional 
possibilities for the articulation of different views, projects, and programs dealing with problems 
of social development aside from those which are launched by the Party apparatus. If such 
initiatives nevertheless appear (especially in management, among professors and students at 
universities, in associations of writers and other humanistic intellectuals) they have been severely 
repressed, or, at best, merely published in some newspapers with no possibility of being 
realized.11 The Party elite on all levels in principle does not avoid engaging in dialogue with 
proponents of such initiatives based on the "power of arguments," but rather in the last instance 
uses the "argument of power."12 
However, the awareness of the average citizen is manipulable in the past. Our statistics 
on public opinion in Slovenia show that only 8.3% of the respondents (and that is the lowest 
percentage since 1968) believe that "the politics of the League of Communists is commensurate 
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with the interest of the majority," partial accord is perceived by 48.9%, while 25.6% see no such 
compatibility. 65.4% stated that Communists in their midst have little or no prestige, and only 
5.5% think that this prestige is great. Clearly the prestige of the League of Communists as an 
organization as well as of individual Communists has sunk to a critical level. 
Obviously, such a state of affairs cannot continue. There are three general ways out of the 
crisis. The first would be the restoration (certainly in a form modified by changed circumstances) of 
the classical Bolshevik (or Leninist) system of the leading role of the Communist Party, which, 
using mechanisms of power, including repression, maintains its positions in society. In other 
words, a pure single party system. 
The second would be the liberalization of political life, enabling various forms of 
political pluralism that would differ from republic to republic depending on political traditions and 
level of development. 13 
The third alternative could be the militarization of political life, namely, a Yugoslav 
variant of Poland after 1980.14 
CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN THE FEDERATION 
The last scenario of possible solutions of the crisis of Yugoslav society is linked 
understanding to the crisis of the concept of the Yugoslav federation as a community of republics 
and provinces, each with certain characteristics of statehood and sovereignty according to the 
present constitution. In the 1980s more frequent and openly articulated conflicts took place 
between the republics and nationalities. A thoroughgoing sociological analysis would point to the 
existence of tensions and potential conflicts much earlier; however, they were not openly 
expressed. This was partially because of the charismatic personality of President Tito. Already in 
the 1970s there was a major attempt to deal politically in an open manner with the so-called 
"nationalism" in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Without going into the justifiability or 
unjustifiability of the political removal from power of a group of politicians including Marko 
Nikezic in Serbia, Dr. Savka Dapcevic-Kucar in Croatia, Stan Kavcic in Slovenia, and Krste 
Crvenkovski in Mecedonia, I believe that this phenomenon was already a major indicator of the 
existence of difficulties in the functioning of the Yugoslav federation. The current crisis in the 
concept of the Yugoslav federation is expressed phenomenologically primarily in the very openly 
expressed quite contradictory views about the forthcoming Constitution planned for 1988. Three 
basic orientations of the political elites [of the republics] and to some degree also the mood of the 
citizenry can be discerned. 
The first orientation may be named centralism or, as it is frequently and pejoratively 
called, "unitarism." According to its protagonists the present order, based upon the 1970 
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Constitution, contributed considerably to the present crisis. The political elites of the republics, 
according to this view, cared more for their nations than for the federation. The system of inter­
republican consultations and consensus-building makes an efficient federation impossible. The 
second house of the federal parliament, the so-called Assembly of Republics and Provinces, in 
which the federal units are represented by an equal number of delegates, so that no single nation 
can outvote the others is especially criticized. In addition, each republic h�s veto power in all 
crucial issues. Because of this, centrists argue, the federation needs more power. Others, however, 
see in the centrist position the possibility of erosion of essential rights of nationalities and a new 
variant of the domination of Serbs in Yugoslavia. 
The second orientation which advocates the status quo in all essentials of the 
constitutional regulations of the position of republics and provinces, preserve their current basic 
rights in the future as well. Its proponents agree that some corrections are needed in order to 
improve the system. 
The third orientation promotes an even greater independence of the republics. It advocates 
the concept of a new federation which would give the federal government very precisely defined 
functions and rights (e.g. foreign policy and defense of the foundations of the system). 
Hardly anyone is satisfied with the present constitutional arrangement 15 Illustrative is 
the attitude of the people in Slovenia, 59.1% of whom believe that the republics should have 
greater economic, political, and cultural independence in the future, 17.8% of whom are satisfied 
with the current order, and 8.9% of whom favor centralization. 16 The citizens of Slovenia also 
favor by 56.8% a referendum on constitutional changes; only 17. 1% oppose it. All of this 
suggests that the Yugoslavia public is not as manipulable as before, that people seek to exert their 
influence, and that they wish to participate directly in decision-making. It will be difficult for 
political elites, unless they resort to repression, to make decisions without taking into 
consideration the will of the people. 
The question of social and economic relations between developed and underdeveloped parts 
of Yugoslavia is essential for an understanding of the crisis in the concept of the federation. 
Analysis of popular attitudes as well as of the public statements of politicians shows that neither 
the developed (Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina) nor underdeveloped (Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) areas are satisfied. Serbia displays specific attitudes; its 
politicians argue that the so-called "Serbian complex" in Yugoslavia has had a very damaging 
impact on Serbia's dcvclopmenl.1 7  The developed regions arc convinced that large expenditures 
for the underdeveloped have left insufficient resources for their own further growth. The 
underdeveloped, on the other hand, are dissatisfied with the rate of their growth and seek new aid 
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from the federation. The survey of public opinion in Slovenia in 1987 showed that up to 50.5% 
believe that "the less developed republics should primarily take care of themselves, while the 
Yugoslav federation should help them in that process," 13.4% of the respondents believe that the 
direct responsibility for the undeveloped republics should be borne jointly by the developed 
republics, and 28.4% think that this should be the responsibility of the underdeveloped themselves. 
The distribution of these attitudes would be similar in other developed regions, and of course, 
rather different in the underdeveloped areas of the country. This insight helps to illuminate of the 
background of the crisis of the concept of the federation. 
RELIGION IN THE CRISES 
A Croatian sociologist, Dr. Srdjan Vrcan from Split, recently uttered the aphorism, "from 
the crisis of religion to the religion of crisis," As his assessment of the development of the 
growing Yugoslav crisis on the level of religion. This aphorism is sociologically fruitful; it 
makes possible the verification of my basic hypothesis about the political nature of the crisis in 
Yugoslavia. S till it is very difficult to generalize about the religious situation in Yugoslavia, 
where not only national and ethnic but also religious pluralism is characteristic. In addition to 
three major religions-Orthodox, Christianity, Catholicism, and Islam-there are up to forty 
smaller religious communities, mostly of the Protestant variety. 
The specificity of the Yugoslav religious pluralism was formerly evident in the near and 
at times ever complete of religious and national identification. To some degree this continues to be 
true today. Slovenes and Croats were always mostly Catholics; today this Catholic Christian 
element continues to be significant. Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians are Orthodox. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina all three ethnic groups identify with their respective religions .  Today in 
Croatia and S lovenia a pluralism of worldviews exists, but the Catholic Christian tradition 
influences even non-theistic orientations. The close association of being Serbian and being 
Orthodox can be seen clearly today in regard to the Kosovo situation, about which the S erbian 
political and ecclesiastical elite take nearly identical positions. The Macedonian Orthodox Church 
cooperates directly with Maccdonian politicians in the project of the affirmation of Macedonian 
nationhood. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs identify with Orthodoxy, Croats with 
Catholicism, and the followers of Islam were proclaimed the existence of a new nationality named 
the Muslim nation. 
During 1950s and 1970s, a period of political and economic expansion of Yugoslavia, 
religious pluralism was not clearly emphasized as a variable with a significant impact. That period 
was marked also by an explosion of secularizing processes which caused a crisis in all religions. 
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This crisis was expressed primarily in the decrease in church membership, in lesser participation in 
rituals, and in the basic reduction of church influence on social, cultural, and political issues. 18 
The period of general crisis since 1980, however is marked by major changes in the social 
and political functioning of religious pluralism. Conflicts between nationalities are now also 
expressed on a religious level. Christian ecumenism as a movement to improve cooperation 
between all Christian groups, has come into a crisis. Although outright war even intense conflict 
between the Orthodox and Catholics not longer occur, the two, nevertheless have significantly 
reduced their cooperative activities. Polemics over the responsibility for the slaughter during World 
War II were resumed. The bloody fighting on Yugoslav territory between 1941 and 1945 
manifested many of the traits of classical religious wars. Catholics killed Orthodox, Orthodox 
killed Muslims, and so forth, all in the name of religion and religious interests. Every sociological 
analysis must take this historical evidence into consideration. 
Empirical sociological studies point out the simultaneous suspension of the secularizing 
processes. The tendency toward decrease in church membership and participation in rituals has 
either completely stopped or even reversed itself. Instead the opposite has happened: a new 
revitalization of church membership and an increase of popular interest in religious symbolism and 
a search for the meaning of life. In the specific Yugoslav circumstances these changes in the 
religious situation mean at least two things. 
On the one hand, the trend indicates that the same process is occuring as in other 
countries in which a revitalization of religion took place because of the grave crisis in which they 
found themselves. This crisis arose especially in respect to those spiritual-cultural dimensions 
which defmed the meaning of life and human future in non-religious (and sometimes even anti­
religious) terms, and even in respect to those religious-cultural orientations which with their 
demands for a religious reform redefined the religious meaning of the human species and its vision 
of a more just social order and system.19 
On the other hand, the growth in church membership may also be indirectly related to the 
feelings of national insecurity. There is, namely, a need for a clear national identity, which, after 
its initial emancipation from religion, again seems to be merging national and religious identity. 
Only this can explain the data of the research of public opinion in Slovenia, in which the 
respondents name the factors which in their opinion distance and divide the nations of Yugoslavia: 
In % 1 9 72 1 9 80 1 9 82 1287 
working habits 12.2 20.9 36.6 54.6 
language 13.7 4 1 .5 40.4 50.4 
living standard 1 1 .5 23.7 22.4 35.0 
religious affiliation 12.7 25.2 25. 1  34.2 
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cultural traditions 
etc.20 
4.7 1 7.0 19.5 25.5 
Obviously, the crisis situation reactivated the inter-relationship between the religious, 
national, and political feelings. The predominance of the political clement in the contemporary 
crisis of Yugoslav society is thus confirmed. 
From all that was stated it is clear that the title given to this sociological discourse, 
"Yugoslavia at Crossroads" was justified. This was not done to dramatize the current situation, 
because there were many other societies which faced dilemmas of their further development. We 
only wanted to present to the interested public a possible interpretation of the current situation in 
Yugoslavia. 
Translated from Croato-Serbian by 
Dr. Paul Mojzes 
Rosemont College, Rosemont, PA 
Edited by Arlene and Leonard Swidler 
1 Thc republic of Slovenia is the westernmost region of Yugoslavia. Although the Slovenes are 
merely 8% of the population they produce as much as 18% of the GNP. of Yugoslavia. In Slovenia the per 
capital G.N.P. is 202.8 (Yugoslavia being 100), while in Kosovo, for instance, it is only 27.8, in Macedonia 
64.2, in Montenegro 78.0; Slovenia is approximated only by Croatia with 125.3 and Vojvodina with 1 17.8. 
Slovenian research into public opinion has been carried out since 1968; it is the only research project 
of this type in Yugoslavia. Here only an excerpt from the total tables is given, which was officially published 
in Ljubljana (Slovens/co javno mnjenje 1987 [Slovene Public Opinion 1987], Ljubljana, 1987, 104 pp.) For 
this article we have selected only four years which were researched, 1978, 1980,1984, and 1987. The percent of 
those who did not respond arc not included in the tables. Only a few themes among those to which the 
responses were gathered have been selected for this paper. 
2certainly I do not pretend to offer a qualified economic analysis, because my approach is 
sociological. However, the economic evidence is, on the phenomenological level, absolutely necessary for a 
sociological analysis. 
3Strikes have become a more or less legitimate protest of workers also in Yugoslavia. One should 
mention that at least a part of the political elite considers strikes as contrarevolutionary. Since the right to 
strike is not yet legally regulated there is always a possibility of repression against the strikers in case a 
restoration of power in the hands of dogmatically oriented politicians were to come about. 
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4-nte program was approved in November and December, 1987. This program of the prime minister, 
Branko Mikulic, was opposed in the parliament primarily by the delegation of deputies from Slovenia. 
5only the main characteristics of the Bolshevik model was pointed out here. This model still 
burdens the consciousness of the Yugoslav political elite despite years of attempting to create another model of 
social development since the rupture between Tito and Stalin in 1948. Among those efforts one should 
specifically mention the establishment of selfmanagement (1950) and the reorganization of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia into a League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1952). 
6we don' t  mean only the political elite at the federal level but also the groups of politicians on the 
level of the republics and provinces, or even counties and boroughs, where there is even a greater opportunity 
of severe limitation of political and other initiative of citizens. Up till now there was a great dependency of 
political groups. The promotion of lower ranking politicians was directly dependent upon higher ranking 
politicians and not due to the will of the people. This is generally the case in every hierarchically organized 
society. 
7Due to real factors one must differentiate the political theory and practice of Yugoslavia from the 
practice of Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. A very significant attempt to democratize was the 
proposal in the seventies by the Yugoslav leader Eduard Kardelj in his book, Smjerovi razvoja socijalistickog 
samoupravljanja [The Direction of Development of Socialist Selfmanagement], which also advocated the so 
called pluralism of selfmanaging inlerests. 
Bne reference is again to the previously mentioned research. The data cannot be generalized for all of 
Yugoslavia except that they do have an indicative character. 
9 All these statistics are for 1987 and were published as previously mentioned. 
lDQne must not forget that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia ever since 1937, when Tito became 
its leader, functioned fairly autonomously and was not the blind executor of directives from Moscow. This was 
particularly the case during the war (19411-1945) and after 1948. 
1 1  In this respect there are differences in various parts of Yugoslavia. It seems that the freedom of 
expressing "alternative" political initiatives is currently most available in Slovenia, and less in other 
republics. The degree of intellectual freedom is fairly flexible and dynamic. These "areas of freedom" are 
sometimes greater in Croatia than in Slovenia or Serbia, etc. depending on the makel-up of the party elite in 
the republics. It seems that currently in Serbia proper, especially in Belgrade, it is most restricted because the 
political power is held by a fairly dogmatic party group. 
12This is confirmed also by the most recent development in Belgrade. The group around the party 
chief Milosevic did not only square accounts with the group around the president of the Serbian state, Ivan 
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Stambolic, but the repression is extended again to Belgrade University and to the communication media. Due 
to the power of Serbia in the federation this could have fatal consequences for other parts of Yugoslavia. 
1 3Il is believed, for instance, that in Slovenia it would be possible to revitalize the so called 
Osvobodilna Fronta [Front of National Liberation] from World War II, which was made up as a pluralistic 
movement of four equal groups: Communists, Christian Socialists, prominent personalities of cultural life, 
and Sokols (a liberal gymnastic organization), but which lost its pluralistic character after the war due to the 
"Bolshevik take-over" and the Stalinization of the system. 
14The sociological approach allows also this variant although the leading military leaders of 
Yugoslavia publicly repudiated such a scenario on a number of occasions. The same leaders namely stated that 
the Yugoslav army is a significant integrative force in Yugoslavia, which, even from a sociological 
perspective, partially corresponds to reality. 
15The term "no one" primarily connotes political elites in the republics and provinces, which, at 
least up till now, did not care what people thought or merely appealed to public opinion occasionally and 
pragmatically. 
16From the previously mentioned research. 
17Note the well known slogan, "A weak Serbia-a strong Yugoslavia." This means, that on the 
basis of historical experience of other nations a strong Serbia within Yugoslavia always meant a domination of 
Serbs over others. The historical experience of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia also points to this. 
18There were numerous sociological empirical studies on these issues which were published and 
verified even at international scholarly conferences. I worked on these issues systematically since 1968. In 
Slovenia the membership of the Catholic Church in 1978 was reduced to less than 50% of the adult 
population. 
l 9sociologists sometimes explained the growth of Christian fundamentalism in the U.S.A. by 
means of these factors. 
20nis is merely an excerpt from the published survey of the research of Slovenian public opinion 
from 1968 to 1987. 
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